This issue of postmedieval explores the role of laughter and humor in medievalism. The medieval period has long provided a fund of images and ideas that have been vital to defining 'the modern. ' From the earliest parodies of medieval chivalry, through to the scatological humor of contemporary internet medievalism, it is clear that as long as there has been medievalism, people have indulged in medievalist laughter. Comic engagement with the Middle Ages has had a vital role in the postmedieval imaginary, and thus warrants serious attention, but to date it has not received sustained analysis. The work that has appeared on comic medievalist texts has not yet led to the development of a critical language to understand the 'affectivehistorical' responses these texts generate. The essays in this issue take steps toward the development of that language.
complexity of laughing at the Middle Ages. Taken together, they demonstrate comic medievalism's capacity to both query and reify historical periodization, as well as its tendency to preserve cherished notions of the Middle Ages even as it appears to question them. This issue's appeal to laughter as a heuristic bridge between the medieval and the modern has a striking early precedent. In his 1946 article 'Mediaeval Laughter,' J. S. P. Tatlock sets out to counter Louis Cazamian's contention in The Development of English Humor that the 'mental complexity' underlying modern humor was 'not very widely diffused' before the Renaissance. Having related accounts from Walter Map's De nugis curialium of witty banter between Henry II and St Hugh of Lincoln, as well as Map's own scandalous joke about monks lying down on boys, Tatlock digresses briefly from his historical argument to assert, contra Cazamian:
Any highly civilized and cultivated modern will recognize in these conversations and the laughter [...] the presence of people essentially like himself, responding to quick-wittedness and perception precisely as he would respond. At the very least this will tend to humanize the middle ages for moderns, which sometimes is needed [...] by laughing together we can erase the traces of divergence or failure of sympathy (Tatlock, 1946, 289-90) . 1 Tatlock's excursus is noteworthy for its argument that looking at the Middle Ages through the lens of shared laughter affords a sympathetic, 'humanizing' illumination of medieval people. It shows that even in one the earliest forays into understanding medieval humor, laughter was regarded as a phenomenon that is historically specific yet also universally human and hence trans-historical, capable of destabilizing historical demarcations.
The idea of laughter's human universality is far from exclusive to Tatlock. While the contention from Aristotle onward that laughter is uniquely human has not gone undisputed by ethologists, the consensus that it is nevertheless universally human has made it the focus of investigation across the social and human sciences. Its complexity as a human behavior, and its intimate (though not exclusive) relationship to the cultural phenomena of humor and comedy, has led anthropologists, linguists, psychologists, psycho-biologists, cognitive scientists, philosophers, and cultural theorists to apply themselves to the questions of its origins, its symptoms, its manifestations, its purposes, and its effects.
Despite these comprehensive efforts, laughter remains one of the most elusive of phenomena. A key aspect of its resistance to analytical containment is its composite nature as a physiological reflex that nevertheless marks what Simon Critchley calls 'the distance of human culture from animal life' (Critchley, 2001, 28) . Physically involuntary, human laughter is also rich with existential apprehension and, in most cases, responsive to social expectations and values. To take a simple example, our laughter at seeing an Academy Award recipient tripping onstage is spontaneous, but is also existential in that we bear amused witness to the human will being thwarted by contingency, and social in that we enjoy the spectacle of inversion as the exalted quite literally fall before our eyes. Those who have sought to define what is distinctive about human laughter have repeatedly seen it as a property of humans' capacity to reflect on their experiences and objectify themselves.
William Hazlitt's opening claim in On Wit and Humour (1819) that humans laugh because they are 'the only animal that is struck with the difference between what things are and what they ought to be' (Hazlitt, 1845, 2) receives later philosophical elaboration in Helmuth Plessner's persuasive argument that laughter is a central means by which humans experience and express their 'eccentric positionality,' that is their awareness of the relativity of their own subjectivity. For Plessner, humans break into laughter at such 'unanswerable' but nonthreatening phenomena as paradox, ambiguity, ambivalence and the multiplicity of meaning, because these expose, and demand recognition of, the breach between humans' subjective and objective experience. These phenomena are most frequently encountered in the form of jokes, humor, and comic texts, but also in embarrassment (Plessner, 1970, 138-42; see also Prusak 2006) . These arguments about laughter as a reflective practice can be extrapolated beyond the behavior of the individual, to encompass its broader operation within the social field. It is a truism among sociologists of humor that what a society collectively laughs at discloses its aspirations, norms, and boundaries, and is vital to the formation of its identity (Davies, 1998; Billig, 2005; Lockyer and Pickering 2005) . There has been a strong focus over the last two decades on the ethics of humor as an instrument of social tolerance or exclusion, with humor scholars attempting to calibrate the social dynamics between the subject (or 'teller') of the comic text, its object, and its audience, in an attempt to identify the line between humor and offense. There is broad consensus that humor and the laughter it elicits operate diversely within the social field: they can be expressions of social norms, or, conversely, function as reflexive meditations on those norms. Whatever the intention, however, the exercise of humor, and the response to it via laughter, are both reflective practices in so far as they lay bare the rich, though often fraught, intersubjective nature of social experience. Humor and laughter are, from this perspective, inherently ethical practices which can have direct and even urgent ramifications for the coherent functioning of the social body.
One aspect of this social operation that is overlooked in the scholarly and philosophical literature is the ways human societies use laughter to reflect on the specifically historical dimension of their 'eccentric positionality.' To date, almost no scholarship has dealt with this question, with the exception of Hannu Salmi's recent edited collection Historical Comedy on Screen (2011), which is nevertheless more focused on cinema than on historical humor as an existential symptom or practice. Yet despite this oversight, it is plausible to extrapolate from Plessner and his followers (who include Critchley) that registering the passage of time, and one's place within it, is vital to recognizing the temporal and historical relativity of one's own existence, world-view and beliefs. Following the logic of Plessner's account, a natural corollary to this recognition is amusement: both the past and the present become mutually relative and hence equally risible. Laughing at the past, then, becomes an index of a later society's historical self-understanding as well as of its perception of the relationship of the present to the past.
As the essays in this issue show, the idea of laughter arising out of a sense of historical relativity is a particularly fertile one for considering medievalist humor and the laughter it solicits from its audiences. It explains, for instance, why comparatively little comic medievalism has engaged in straightforward ridicule of the Middle Ages, or has had recourse to what humor scholars call 'superiority' humor, a notion derived from Thomas Hobbes's notorious statement that 'the passion of laughter is nothing else but a sudden glory arising from sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmities of others, or with our own formerly: for men laugh at the follies of themselves past, when they come suddenly to remembrance' (Hobbes, 1928, 32) . Given the medieval period has elicited numerous serious representations of it as ideologically retrograde, superstitious, technophobic -in sum, the antithesis of progress one might expect to find a dominant strain of superiority comedy in which these 'backward' qualities are the target of modern mockery. Such a portrayal of a risibly static Middle Ages is the historical counterpart to the ridiculous human formulated by Henri Bergson in his hugely influential treatise Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic. Just as Bergson's risible human invites laughter because his behavior is driven by rigidity, habit and 'a certain mechanical inelasticity' that marks his failure to adapt to his surroundings (Bergson, 1914, 10) , so too the image of a rigidly tradition-bound Middle Ages would seem to invite ridicule for its failure to engage with the necessity of progress: to draw out the historicist inflection in Hobbes's statement, the ridiculousness of the Middle Ages would appear to be simultaneously that of 'others' and of '[our]selves past.' But in fact this variety of comic medievalism is surprisingly uncommon.
Even the apparently paradigmatic example of medievalist 'superiority' humor, Mark Twain's Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court, is complicated by the fact that it enfolds a critique of modernity into its portrayal of the hard-headed Hank Morgan's attempts to modernize the change-averse Arthurian world. On the surface Hank's tale of his time at Arthur's court ridicules the superstitious credulity of the premoderns, and the oppressive hierarchies of feudalism; in this respect is aligned with Twain's well-known desire to expose the ugly truth of Feudalism to those among his Southern contemporaries whose Scottian fantasies about medieval culture bolstered, in his view, their support of slavery. However, the instability of Hank's characterization means that the novel is also satirizing American technological triumphalism and its failure to recognise the violence of industry or the inequities generated by capitalistic entrepreneurial meritocracy. Twain's sense of the historical relativity of his own age, of the costs of both nostalgia and of unbridled 'progress,' prevents him from limiting his book to simple mockery of the Middle Ages.
Similarly, Stephen Knight's discussion of Enlightenment medievalism in this issue reveals that well before Twain's novel, getting laughs out of the Middle Ages, or more specifically out of medieval sexual vulgarity, could be used to more complex ends than simple derision. Examining a cluster of comic medievalist texts produced by Swift, Pope, and Voltaire, he uncovers in them an intricate dynamic of ridicule and recuperation. Although the Middle Ages are without doubt represented as coarse and obscene -in Voltaire's case, scurrilously so each of these writers is drawn to what this era makes possible for them to write; in other words, 'the medieval extends a space for sexual licence.' While Knight signals that the sexuality to which the appropriated Middle Ages gives expression is troublingly male and adolescent, it should nevertheless be acknowledged that reworking medieval materials opened up a discursive space for 'both contemporary comment and personal licence --two forms of resistance to eighteenth-century modernity [and] contemporary mores.' The liberatory potential of the medieval means that mockery never establishes a firm foothold.
In one of his most memorable but contested statements, Bergson claims that laughter requires 'something like a momentary anesthesia of the heart' (Bergson, 1914, 5) . The distinguishing tone of humor that is driven by an acknowledgement of modernity's 'eccentric positionality,' however, rather than by an untroubled affirmation of its supersession of the past, is one of sympathy. This is the case even with comic texts exploring recent Shocks of the New: the madcap virtuosity of Charlie Chaplin's Modern Times (1936) , for instance, is never less than genial toward its workers dehumanized by their assembly line existence, while Jacques Tati's Play Time (1967) is famous for the tender absurdism of its depiction of Monsieur Hulot's bewildered encounters with impersonal modernity. The fact that the titles of both films draw attention to time, and to modernity as one stage in a larger temporal continuum, relativizes the Now and exposes it to reflective examination. But sympathy is also the tenor of much medievalist humor. On the same theme of technology, 'Medieval Helpdesk,' the beloved Norwegian television skit that I discuss in my essay within, playfully draws a parallel between medieval and twenty-first-century information technologies in a way that encourages the audience to identify with the befuddled monk Brother Ansgar as he grapples with that intimidating new information platform, the book. Although this skit superficially appears to be mocking medieval people for their quaint fear of the humble book, in fact its main, highly sympathetic, point is that the transition to new technologies is inherently disorienting, and that no matter how up-to-date we moderns think ourselves, contact with the New can leave one feeling thoroughly 'medieval,' unmoored by constant change. Kim Wilkins' essay shows that in the case of comic medievalist internet memes, a shared sympathy for the medieval in turn fosters networks of sympathy or 'affinity spaces' (many of them geek-inflected). In these spaces, 'produsers' of these often densely allusive memes delight not only in exploring the extremely 'adaptogenic' nature of the Middle Ages within digital culture, but also in belonging to a community whose members' specialized knowledge of the medieval and of medievalism means they are in on the joke. Plessner's notion that laughter is a response to such 'unanswerable' existential conundra as paradox and polysemy corresponds readily to the pleasure in anachronism that lies at the heart of a great deal of comic medievalism. With its deliberately playful confusion of temporality (the modern in the medieval, the medieval in the modern, the medieval as modern, the modern as medieval), anachronism is, as I discuss in my essay in this issue, a supple historicized form of what humor theorists describe as incongruity humor, a comic category developed out of Arthur Schopenhauer's formulation of Inkongruenz (Schopenhauer, 1989, 59 ). Critchley's statement that the laughter elicited by incongruity humor is 'produced by the experience of a felt incongruity between what we know or expect to be the case, and what actually takes place in the joke' (Critchley, 2002, 3) can readily be adapted to describe the comic effect produced by the countless medievalist texts that make use of anachronism. In some cases, such as the medievalist memes discussed by Wilkins, anachronism goes hand in hand with the amusing incongruity of the medieval thriving within digital technology, and the anarchic blend of the 'serious' and the historical with 'low' culture (in one case, the Bayeux Tapestry intersects with the schlock film Snakes on a Plane). Medievalism and the Modern World' (FT120100931), which has enabled me to devote four years exclusively to this fascinating subject. The contributors and I would like to acknowledge the ARC's support. Our warmest thanks also to Eileen Joy and Myra Seaman for their enthusiasm, patience, and practical guidance. In particular, they encouraged us to participate in Postmedieval's Crowd Review process, hosted by the Academic Commons site at New York University. The copious expert commentary the essays attracted through this transparent and communal process was surprising and rewarding. We all wish to express our sincere gratitude to the colleagues who took the time to engage so generously with our essays, helping us develop and improve our arguments. Even if not all the comments (and some essays received dozens!) could be incorporated into the essays, they are already proving invaluable for the development of our future work, and have provided inspiration for many of the ideas in this Introduction. We hope this issue will inspire further investigation into how, and why, 'the medieval' has elicited so much rich and enduring laughter.
